We consider an exchange who wishes to set suitable make-take fees to attract liquidity on its platform. Using a principal-agent approach, we are able to describe in quasi-explicit form the optimal contract to propose to a market maker. This contract depends essentially on the market maker inventory trajectory and on the volatility of the asset. We also provide the optimal quotes that should be displayed by the market maker. The simplicity of our formulas allows us to analyze in details the effects of optimal contracting with an exchange, compared to a situation without contract. We show in particular that it leads to higher quality liquidity and lower trading costs for investors.
Introduction
With the fragmentation of financial markets, exchanges are nowadays in competition. Indeed the traditional international exchanges are now challenged by alternative trading venues, see [16] . Consequently, they have to find innovative ways to attract liquidity on their platforms. One solution is to use a make-taker fees system, that is a rule enabling * This work benefits from the financial support of the Chaires Analytics and Models for Regulation, Financial Risk and Finance and Sustainable Development. Omar El Euch and Mathieu Rosenbaum gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the ERC Grant 679836 Staqamof. Nizar Touzi gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the ERC Grant 321111 RoFiRM. Thibaut Mastrolia gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the ANR PACMAN. The authors also thank Bas Werker for relevant comments. them to charge in an asymmetric way liquidity provision and liquidity consumption. The most classical setting, used by many exchanges (such as Nasdaq, Euronext, BATS Chi-X...), is of course to subsidize the former while taxing the latter. In practice, this means associating a fee rebate to executed limit orders and applying a transaction cost for market orders.
In the recent years, the topic of make-take fees has been quite controversial. Indeed maketake fees policies are seen as a major facilitating factor to the emergence of a new type of market makers aiming at collecting fee rebates: the high frequency traders. As stated by the Securities and Exchanges commission in [26] : "Highly automated exchange systems and liquidity rebates have helped establish a business model for a new type of professional liquidity provider that is distinct from the more traditional exchange specialist and over-the-counter market maker." The concern with high frequency traders becoming the new liquidity providers is two-fold. First, their presence implies that slower traders no longer have access to the limit order book, or only in unfavorable situations when high frequency traders do not wish to support liquidity. This leads to the second classical criticism against high frequency market makers: they tend to leave the market in time of stress, see [3, 20, 21, 24] for detailed investigations about high frequency market making activity.
From an academic viewpoint, studies of make-take fees structures and their impact on the welfare of the markets have been mostly empirical, or carried out in rather stylized models. An interesting theory, suggested in [1] and developed in [5] is that make-take fees have actually no impact on trading costs in the sense that the cum fee bid-ask spread should not depend on the make-take fees policy. This result is consistent with the empirical findings in [17, 19] . Nevertheless, it is clearly shown in these works that many important trading parameters such as depths, volumes or price impact do depend on the make-take fees structure, see also [12] . Furthermore, the idea of the neutrality of the make-take fees schedule is also tempered in [10] where the authors show theoretically that make-take fees may increase welfare of markets provided the tick size is not equal to zero, see also [4] .
In this work, our aim is to provide a quantitative and operational answer to the question of relevant make-take fees. To do so, we take the position of an exchange (or of the regulator) wishing to attract liquidity. The exchange is looking for the best make-take fees policy to offer to market makers in order to maximize its utility. In other words, it aims at designing an optimal contract with the market marker to create an incentive to increase liquidity. For simplicity, we consider a single market maker in a non-fragmented market.
Incentive theory has emerged in the 1970s in economics to model how a financial agent can delegate the management of an output process to another agent. Let us recall the formalism of principal-agent problems from the seminal works of Mirrlees [22] and Holmström [13] . A principal aims at contracting with an agent who provides efforts to manage an output process impacting the wealth of the principal. The principal is not able to control directly the output process since he cannot decide the efforts made by the agent. In our case, the principal is the exchange, the agent is the market maker, the efforts correspond to the quality of the liquidity provided by the market maker (essentially the size of the bid-ask spread proposed by the market maker) and the output process is the transactions flow on the platform. Several economics papers have investigated this kind of problems by identifying it with a Stackelberg equilibrium between the two parties. More precisely, since the principal cannot control the work of the agent, he anticipates his best-reaction effort for a given compensation. Knowing that, the principal aims at finding the best contract.
In our work, we deal with a continuous-time principal-agent problem. Indeed, the exchange monitors the spread set by the market maker around a Brownian-type efficient price and the transactions flow in continuous-time. Thus, we follow the stream of literature initiated in [14] . Then in [25] , the author recasts such issue into a stochastic control problem which has been further developed using backward stochastic differential equation theory in [7] . See also [8] for related literature.
In this paper, although we work in a quite general and realistic setting, we are able to solve our principal-agent problem. More precisely, we provide a quasi-explicit expression for the optimal contract the exchange should propose to the market maker, and also for the quotes the market maker should set. The optimal contract depends essentially on the market maker inventory trajectory and on the volatility of the market. These simple formulas enable us to analyze in details the effects for the welfare of the market of optimal contracting with an exchange, compared to a situation without contract as in [2, 11] . We notably show that using such contracts leads to reduced spreads and lower trading costs for investors.
The paper is organized as follows. Our modeling approach is presented in Section 2. In particular, we define the market maker's as well as the exchange's optimization framework. In Section 3, we compute the best response of the market maker for a given contract. Optimal contracts are designed in Section 4 where we solve the exchange's problem. Then, in Section 5, we assess the benefits for market quality of the presence of an exchange contracting optimally with a market maker. Finally, useful technical results are gathered in an appendix.
The model
The framework considered throughout this paper is inspired by the seminal work [2] where the authors consider the problem of optimal market making, but without the intervention of an exchange. Let T > 0 be a final horizon time and (Ω, F) be a measurable space such that Ω = Ω c × (Ω d ) 2 with Ω c the set of continuous functions from [0, T ] into R, Ω d the set of piecewise constant càdlàg functions from [0, T ] into N and F the Borel algebra on Ω. We consider the following canonical process (
We endow the space (Ω,
T ] are the right-continuous completed filtrations associated with the components of (χ t ) t∈[0,T ] .
We consider a market where there is only one market maker. This market maker has a view on the efficient price of the asset given by S t . We assume that
with S 0 > 0, W a Brownian motion and σ > 0 the volatility of the price 1 . For t ∈ [0, T ], the market maker fixes the bid and ask prices P b t and P a t as follows
We assume that the arrival of ask (resp. bid) market orders is modeled by a point process
. We also suppose that the volume of market orders is constant and equal to unity. Hence, the inventory process of the market maker Q is given by
As in [11] , we impose a critical absolute inventoryq ∈ N above which the market maker stops quoting on the ask or bid side, i.e.
We expect the intensity of buy (resp. sell) market order arrivals to depend on the extra cost of each trade payed by the market taker compared to the efficient price. This extra cost is the sum of the spread δ a t (resp. δ b t ) imposed by the market maker and the transaction cost c > 0 collected by the exchange, as explained in Section 2.2. Moreover, we recall that from classical financial economics results, see [9, 18, 28] , the average number of trades per unit of time is a decreasing function of the ratio between the spread and the volatility. Hence, we assume that
for fixed positive constants A and k.
Admissible controls and market maker's problem
We work with the set A of admissible controls (δ t ) t∈[0,T ] = (δ a t , δ b t ) t∈[0,T ] where any δ ∈ A is predictable and satisfies
Here, δ ∞ is a fixed positive constant which will be fixed later to a sufficiently large value. For each control process δ = (δ a , δ b ) of the market maker, we denote by P δ the associated probability measure under which S follows (1) and
are martingales. In that case, the profit and loss process of the market maker is defined by
Here, X δ is the cash flow process and QS represents the inventory risk process 2 .
Next, we introduce the Doléans-Dade exponential
which is a P 0 −local martingale 3 as it can be verified by direct application of Itô's formula that
Since δ a and δ b are uniformly bounded, this local martingale satisfies the Novikov-type criterion in [27] and thus is a martingale. From Theorem III.3.11 in [15] , it follows that
In particular, all the probability measures P δ indexed by δ ∈ A are equivalent. We therefore use the notation a.s for almost surely without ambiguity. We shall write E δ t for the conditional expectation with respect to F t with probability measure P δ .
We consider that the exchange is compensated for each market order arrival and so aims at keeping the market liquid. Thus, we assume that it proposes to the market maker a contract, defined by an F T -measurable random variable ξ, in order to create an incentive to attract liquidity on the platform by reducing his spread. In addition to the realized profit and loss (3) on [0, T ], the market maker receives a compensation ξ from the exchange at the final time T , thus leading to the maximization problem,
Here, γ > 0 is the absolute risk aversion parameter of the CARA market maker. For each compensation ξ, we show that there exists a unique optimal responseδ(ξ) = (δ a (ξ),δ b (ξ)) of the market marker. 
The exchange optimal contracting problem
We assume that the exchange is compensated by a fixed amount c > 0 for each market order that occurs in the market. In practice, some exchanges add to this fixed fee a component which is proportional to the traded amount in currency value. However, since we are anyway working on a short time interval, we take c independent of the price of the asset. Note that the fee schedule considered here for the taker side is simple. Indeed, in practice, complex fee policies are rather dedicated to market makers. Furthermore, we will in fact see that when acting optimally, the exchange is somehow indifferent to the value of c, see Section 4.3.
The exchange aims at maximizing the total number of market orders N a
arrived during the time interval [0, T ], whose arrival intensities are controlled exclusively by the market maker. The role of the contract ξ proposed by the exchange to the market maker is to encourage the latter to increase the liquidity of the market. In this case, the profit and loss of the exchange is given by
Thus the exchange optimally chooses the contract to maximize its CARA utility function with absolute risk aversion parameter η > 0,
We now define the set of admissible contracts C. Concerning the problem of the exchange, we need to ensure that
is not degenerated. The natural condition that we need is then to assume that sup δ∈A E δ e η ξ < +∞, for some η > η. (7) Since N a and N b are point processes with bounded intensities, this condition together with a Hölder inequality ensure that the problem of the exchange (6) is well defined. Similarly, we will assume that
is not degenerate and hence the welldefinition of the market maker problem (5) . We will also assume that the latter only accepts contracts ξ such that the maximal utility V MM (ξ) is above a threshold value R < 0.
Hence, we denote by C the space of admissible contracts defined by (7) and (8) are satisfied .
We will take −R large enough so that C contains the zero contract ξ = 0 and thus is nonempty.
Solving the market maker's problem
We start by solving the problem (5) of the market maker facing an arbitrary contract ξ ∈ C proposed by the exchange.
Market maker's optimal response
and
For an arbitrary constant Y 0 ∈ R and predictable processes
and we denote by Z the collection of all such processes Z such that Condition (7) is
Clearly, Z = ∅ as it contains all bounded predictable processes and
The next result shows that these sets are in fact equal, and identifies the market maker utility value and the corresponding optimal response. To prove equality of these sets, we are reduced to the problem of representing any contract ξ
which is known in the literature as a problem of backward stochastic differential equation. We refrain from using this terminology, as our analysis does not require any result from this literature.
In particular, C = Ξ. (ii) Under this representation, the market maker utility value is
with the following optimal bid-ask policŷ
The proof of Part (i) of the previous result is reported in Section A.2. This representation is obtained by using the dynamic continuation utility process of the market maker, following the approach of Sannikov [25] . We prove that the continuation utility process satisfies the dynamic programming principle, so that the required representation follows from the Doob-Meyer decomposition of supermartingales together with the martingale representation theorem.
We first prove that for an arbitrary bid-ask policy δ ∈ A, we have
By direct application of Itô's formula, we see that
Hence e −γY is a P δ -local submartingale. Thanks to Condition (10), the uniform boundedness of the intensities of N a and N b and Hölder inequality, (e −γY t ) t∈[0,T ] is uniformly integrable and hence is a true submartingale. By Doob-Meyer decomposition theorem, we conclude that
Designing the optimal contract
DenoteŶ 0 = − 1 γ log(−R). By Theorem 3.1, the exchange problem (6) reduces to the control problem
where Y Y 0 ,Z is given by (9) . In the present context, notice that the market maker optimal responseδ(Y Y 0 ,Z T ) given by (11) 
). Hence, the objective function in (12) is clearly decreasing in Y 0 implying that the maximization under the participation constraint is achieved atŶ 0 ,
The HJB equation for the reduced exchange problem
Motivated by (13), we study in this section the HJB equation corresponding to the stochastic control problem
Our approach is to derive a solution v of the corresponding HJB equation, and to proceed by the standard verification argument in stochastic control to prove that the proposed solution v coincides with the value function v E 0 .
Applying the standard dynamic programming approach to the last control problem, we are led to the following HJB equation
with
A direct calculation reported in Lemma A.4 below reveals that the maximizersẑ =
whereζ
.
Here, we assume that δ ∞ is large enough so that Condition (37) of Lemma A.4 is always met, namely
with the hope that our candidate solution of the HJB equation will verify it. This will be checked in our verification argument. Recall from Lemma A.4 that
Using again the calculation reported in Lemma A.4, we rewrite the HJB equation (15) as
where the constant C is given by
Inspired by [11] , we now make the key observation that this equation can be reduced to a linear equation by introducing u = (−v) − k ση . Indeed, by direct substitution, we obtain the following linear differential equation
This equation can be written in terms of the R 2q+1 −valued function u(t) = u(t, q) q∈{−q,...,q} , of the variable t only, as the linear ordinary differential equation
is a tri-diagonal matrix with lines labelled −q, . . . ,q. Denote by b q the vector of R 2q+1 with zeros everywhere except at the position q, i.e. b q,i = 1I {i=q} for i ∈ {−q, . . . ,q}, and 1 ==−q b q . Then, this ODE has a unique solution
In the next section, we shall prove that this solution v of the HJB equation (15) coincides with the value function of the reduced exchange problem (14), with optimal controlŝ z(t, q) given in (17), thus inducing the optimal contract YŶ 0 ,Ẑ T withẐ t =ẑ(t, Q t− ).
We conclude this section by an alternative representation of the function u. (18) is verified when
Moreover, Condition
Proof. Notice that u is a smooth bounded function. Denote f (
s )ds , as u(T, .) = 1. To see that M is a martingale, we compute by Itô's formula that
Since u is solution of (20), we get
is a martingale. The martingale property of M now follows from the boundedness of u as it can be verified from the expression (21) . Finally, the bound |Q t,q s | ≤q induces directly the announced bounds on u, which in turn imply Condition (18) when (22) is satisfied because v = −u − ση k .
Main result
We are now ready to verify that the function v introduced in the previous section is the value function of the exchange, with optimal feedback controls (ẑ s ,ẑ a ,ẑ b ) as given in (17), thus identifying a unique optimal contract to be proposed by the exchange to the market maker. Recall that δ ∞ denotes the bound on the market maker bid and ask spreads. Our main explicit solution requires δ ∞ to be larger that the constant ∆ ∞ introduced in (22).
Theorem 4.1. Assume that δ ∞ ≥ ∆ ∞ , with ∆ ∞ given by (22) and define u and v by (21) . Then the optimal contract for the problem of the exchange (6) is given bŷ (17). The market maker's optimal effort is given bŷ
Proof. In order to prove this result, we verify that the function v introduced in (21) coincides at (0, Q 0 ) with the value function of the reduced exchange problem (14) , with maximum achieved at the optimal controlẐ.
The function v is negative bounded and has bounded gradient. Moreover, since δ ∞ ≥ ∆ ∞ , it follows that v is a solution of the HJB equation (15) of the exchange reduced problem, see Lemma A.4. For Z ∈ Z, denote
By direct application of Itô's formula, and substitution of ∂ t v from the HJB equation satisfied by v, we see that
where, using the notations of (16) and the subsequent equations,
Exploiting the fact that v is bounded and that K Z is uniformly integrable, see Lemma A.5, we get that v(t, Q t )K Z t t∈[0,T ] is a Pδ (YŶ 0 ,Z T ) -supermartingale and by Doob-Meyer decomposition theorem, the local martingale term in (25) is a true martingale. Hence
by the boundary condition v(T, .) = −1. By arbitrariness of Z ∈ Z, this provides the
On the other hand, consider the maximizerẐ of the reduced exchange problem, induced by the feedback controlsẑ in (17) . AsẐ is bounded, it follows thatẐ ∈ Z. Moreover, hẐ − H = 0, by definition, so that the last argument leads to the equality v(0, Q 0 ) = Eδ (YŶ 0 ,Ẑ T ) − KẐ T , instead of the inequality. This shows that v(0, Q 0 ) = v E 0 , the reduced exchange problem of (14), with optimal controlẐ. From Theorem 3.1, the corresponding optimal market maker response of the market maker is given by (11) with ξ = YŶ 0 ,Ẑ T . Moreover, Condition (18) implies that
Hence the optimal effort could be reduced to (24) .
Discussion
The processesẐ a ,Ẑ b andẐ S allowing the exchange to build the optimal contract have actually quite natural interpretations. Indeed, using Lemma 4.1, we obtain that the quantities
are roughly proportional respectively to Q t− and −Q t− . Thus, when the inventory is highly positive, the exchange provides incentives to the market-maker so that it attracts buy market orders and tries to dissuade him to accept more sell market orders, and conversely for a negative inventory. The integral T 0Ẑ S r dS r can be understood as a risk sharing term. Indeed, t 0 Q r dS r corresponds to the price driven component of the inventory risk Q t S t . Hence in the optimal contract, the exchange supports part of this risk so that the market maker maintains reasonable quotes despite some inventory. The proportion of risk handled by the platform is γ γ+η .
Until now, we have focused on the maker part of the make-take fees problem since we have considered that the taker cost c is fixed. Nevertheless, our approach also enables us to suggest the exchange a relevant value for c. Actually, we see that when acting optimally, the exchange transfers the totality of the fixed taker fee c to the market maker. It is therefore neutral to the value of c as its optimal utility function v E 0 = v(0, Q 0 ) is independent of the taker cost, see (19) . However, c plays an important role in the optimal spread offered by the market maker given by
Furthermore, from numerical computations, we remark that
is close to unity for any t and q. Hence the exchange may fix in practice the transaction cost c so that the spread is close to one tick by setting
For σγ/k small enough, this equation reduces to
Equation (26) is a particularly simple formula to fix the taker constant c. We see that the higher the volatility, the larger the taker cost should be. It is also quite natural that this cost is a decreasing function of k. Indeed, if k is large, the liquidity vanishes rapidly when the spread becomes wide, meaning that market takers are sensitive to extra costs relative to the efficient price. Therefore, the taker cost has to be small if the exchange wants to maintain a reasonable market order flow. Finally, note that the parameters σ and k can be easily estimated from market data. Therefore the formula (26) can be readily used in practice.
5 Impact of the presence of the exchange on market quality and comparison with [2, 11] In this section, we compare our setting with the situation without incentive policy from an exchange towards market making activities. The latter is considered in [2, 11] where the authors deal with the issue of optimal market making without intervention of the exchange. The results in [2] are taken as benchmark for our investigation to emphasize the impact of the incentive policy on market quality. We will refer to this case as the neutral exchange case.
Let us first recall the results in [2, 11] . The optimal controls of the market maker denoted by δ a and δ b are given as a function of the inventory Q t by
where u is the unique solution of the linear differential equation
. In our case, the optimal quoteŝ δ a andδ b are obtained from Theorem 4.1 and satisfŷ
where u is solution of the linear equation (20) .
Numerical experiments show that u and u can decrease quickly to zero when q becomes large. Hence, the computation of the following crucial quantities appearing in the optimal quotes: v + (t, q) = log u(t, q + 1)
can be intricate in practice. To circumvent this numerical difficulty, we remark that v + and v + are solution of the following differential equations
We thus rather apply classical finite difference schemes to (27) and (28) .
In the following numerical illustrations, in the spirit of [11, Section 6] , we take T = 600s for an asset with volatility σ = 0.3 Tick.s −1/2 (unless specified differently). Market orders arrive according to the intensities (2) with A = 1.5s −1 and k = 0.3s −1/2 . We assume that the threshold inventory of the market maker isq = 50 units and we set his risk aversion parameter to γ = 0.01. The exchange is taken more risk averse with η = 1. Finally, we assume that the taker cost c = 0.5 Tick 4 .
Impact of the exchange on the spread and market liquidity
We start by comparing the optimal spreadδ a 0 +δ b 0 at time 0 obtained when contracting optimally with the spread without incentives towards market making activities δ a 0 + δ b 0 . The optimal spreads are plotted in Figure 1 for different initial inventory values Q 0 ∈ {−q, · · · ,q}. We observe in Figure 1 that the initial spread does not depend a lot on the initial inventory (because the considered time interval [0, T ] is not too small) and that it is reduced thanks to the optimal contract between the market maker and the exchange. This is not surprising since in our case the exchange aims at increasing the market order flow by proposing an incentive contract to the market maker inducing a spread reduction. Actually this phenomenon occurs over the whole trading period [0, T ]. To see this, we generate 5000 paths of market scenarios and compute the average spread over [0, T ] for an initial inventory Q 0 = 0. The results are given in Figure 2 . Since the spread is tighter during the trading period under an incentive policy from the exchange, the arrival intensity of market orders is more important and hence the market is more liquid as shown in Figure 3 . We now consider in Figure 4 the bid and ask sides separately. We see that when the inventory is positive and very large,δ a and δ a are negative. It means the market maker is ready to sell at prices lower than the efficient price in order to attract market orders and reduce his inventory risk. On the contrary, if the inventory is negative and very large, in both situations, its ask quotes are well above the efficient price in order to repulse the arrival of buy market orders. However, since in our case the exchange remunerates the market maker for each arrival of market order, we get that the ask spread with contract δ a is smaller than δ a . A symmetric conclusion holds for the bid part of the spread. We now turn to the impact of the volatility on the spread. The optimal contract obtained in (23) induces an inventory risk sharing phenomenon through the termẐ S . Hence, when the volatility increases, the spread difference between situations with/without incentive policy becomes less important, see Figure 5 in which we consider the optimal initial spread difference when the initial inventory is set to zero between both situations with/without incentive policy from the exchange to the market maker for different values of the volatility. Figure 5 : The initial optimal spread difference between both situation with/without incentive policy from the exchange toward the market maker as a decreasing function of the volatility σ.
Impact of the incentive policy on the profit and loss of the exchange and market maker
We assume that Q 0 = 0. Recall that PL δ defined in (3) denotes the trading part of the profit and loss (P&L) of the market maker for a given strategy δ. In our case, the underlying total P&L at time t of a market maker acting optimally, denoted by PL t , is given by
where YŶ 0 ,Ẑ t corresponds to the quantity on the right hand side of (23) with T replaced by t. We now investigate the behavior of this quantity, notably with respect to the benchmark PL δ t which corresponds to the optimal profit and loss without intervention of the exchange.
To make PL t and PL δ t comparable, we chooseŶ 0 in (23) so that the market maker gets the same utility in both situations, that isŶ 0 = k σ log( u(0, Q 0 )). Thus, the market maker is indifferent between the situation with or without exchange intervention. We generate 5000 paths of market scenarios and compare the average of both P&L in Figure 6 with and without incentive policy. SinceŶ 0 is set to obtain the same utility in both cases, the two average P&L are very close at the end of the trading period. The variance of the P&L also seems to be the same in both situations. The only difference from the market maker viewpoint here is that in the case of a contract, the P&L is already made at time 0 thanks to the compensation of the exchange and then fluctuates slightly. This is because he is earning the spread but paying continuous "coupons" H(Ẑ t , Q t ) − σ 2 γ 2 (Ẑ S t + Q t ) 2 dt from the contract. In the case without exchange intervention, the market maker increases his P&L over the whole trading period thanks to the spread.
We now compare the profit and loss of the exchange in the two considered cases. When it applies an incentive policy towards the market maker, the P&L of the exchange is given
When the exchange is neutral, its P&L is simply c(N a t − N a 0 + N b t − N b 0 ). We compare these two quantities in Figure 7 . We see that the initial P&L of the contracting exchange is negative because of the initial paymentŶ 0 . However it finally exceeds, with a smaller standard deviation, the P&L in the situation without incentive policy from the exchange. Hence the incentive policy of the exchange proves to be successful. Indeed, both configurations are equivalent for market makers but the exchange obtains more revenues when contracting optimally. This is due to the fact that the contract triggers more market orders.
Finally, we plot the aggregated average P&L of the market maker and the exchange (independent of the choice of the initial payment). We observe that it is always greater in the optimal contract case. 
Impact of the incentive policy on the trading cost
We now study the impact of the incentive policy on the investors, viewed as the market takers. We assume that there is only one market taker. In the case without exchange, with the specified parameters and under optimal reaction of the market maker, this investor buys on average 200 shares over [0, T ]. To make the comparison with the case with exchange intervention, we modify the parameter A appearing in the intensity (2) when simulating a market with optimal contract. This new value is chosen so that the investor buys on average the same number of assets (200) over the time period. This amounts to take A = 0.9s −1 . We confirm in Figure 9 that the average ask order flows agree in both situations. We finally compare in Figure 10 the average cost of trading for the market taker
with and without incentive. We see that, thanks to the incentive policy of the exchange, the reduced spreads lead to significantly smaller trading costs for investors.
A Appendix

A.1 Predictable representation
The following result is probably well-known, we report it here for completeness as we could not find a precise reference.
Lemma A.1. Let (Ω, F, P, F) be a filtered probability space where F = F W ∨F N is the right continuous completed filtration of a Brownian motion W and a d-dimensional integrable point process N = (N 1 , · · · , N d ) with compensator A = (A 1 , · · · , A d ). Then, for any F−martingale X there exists a predictable process Z = (Z W , Z 1 , · · · , Z d ) such that
Proof. For sake of simplicity, we take d = 1. Let P be a solution of the martingale problem associated to M t = N t − A t and W t . By Theorem III.4.29 in [15] , to prove Lemma A.1 we need to establish the uniqueness of P.
We denote by P W the law P conditional on W . We first show that M is still a martingale under P W . To do so we consider B s ∈ F s and want to prove that
We aim at showing that
Thanks to the martingale representation theorem for Brownian martingales, we can write
where α s = E[1I C |F W s ] and (φ u ) u≥0 is F W predictable process. Using the martingale property of M , we obtain
Then W and M being orthogonal martingales, we deduce
Consequently, using Theorem III.1.21 in [15] , P W is the unique probability measure such that M is an F-martingale conditional on W . Finally, by integration, the uniqueness of P W implies that of P.
A.2 Dynamic programming principle and contract representation
For all F-stopping time τ with values in [t, T ] and for any µ ∈ A τ , we define 5 
For all δ ∈ A, the quotient
does not depend on the values of δ before time τ . Then,
Then,
We next prove the reverse inequality. Let δ ∈ A and µ ∈ A τ . We define
From Bayes' Formula and by noticing that
Thus, Inequality (29) becomes
By using again Bayes' Formula and by noticing that
Since the previous inequality holds for all µ ∈ A τ we deduce from monotone convergence Theorem together with Lemma A.2 that there exists a sequence (µ n ) n∈N of control in A τ such that Proof of Theorem 3.1 (i) We proceed in several steps.
Step 1. For δ ∈ A, it follows from the dynamic programming principle of Lemma A.3 that the process
defines a P δ -supermartingale 6 for all δ ∈ A. By standard analysis, we may then consider it in its càdlàg version (by taking right limits along rationals). By the Doob-Meyer decomposition, we write ≥ 0 is independent of δ ∈ A; recall that U δ < 0.
In order to complete the proof, we argue in the subsequent steps that Z = (Z S , Z a , Z b ) ∈ Z and that for t ∈ [0, T ], 
where H(z, q) = H(z, q) − 1 2 γσ 2 (z s ) 2 .
Step 4. Since V T = −1, notice that The quantities α 0,T T 0 β r− dI r − H(Z r , Q r )dr) and α 0,T T 0 β r da r being non-negative random variables, this implies (33).
Step 5. We now prove that Z ∈ Z by showing that sup δ∈A sup t∈[0,T ] E δ [e −γ(p+1)Yt ] < ∞ for some p > 0.
(36)
Using Hölder inequality together with Condition (8) and the boundedness of the intensities of N a and N b , we have that sup δ∈A E δ [|U δ T | p +1 ] < ∞ for some p > 0. Hence
because U δ is a negative P δ -supermartingale. This leads to (36) using Hölder inequality, the uniform boundedness of the intensities of N a and N b and that e −γY = U δ e γ · 0 (δ a u dN a u +δ b u dN b u +QudSu) .
Step 6. We finally prove uniqueness of the representation. Let (Y 0 , Z), 
Moreover, we notice that ϕ admits a maximum on [−δ ∞ + 1 γ log(1+ σγ k ), δ ∞ + 1 γ log(1+ σγ k )] attained in z = c + 1 η log(v 2 /v 1 ) + 1 η log 1 − σ 2 γη (k + σγ)(k + ση) ,
as soon as δ ∞ ≥ | − z + 1 γ log(1 + σγ k )|. By combining these two conditions, we get the result under Condition (37) on δ ∞ . of N a and N b , we deduce that there exists C > 0 such that
